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WHY ESSENTIALISM REQUIRES TWO SENSES OF NECESSITY1 
Stephen K. McLeod 
 
Abstract 
 
I set up a dilemma, concerning metaphysical modality de re, for the essentialist opponent 
of a ‘two senses’ view of necessity. I focus specifically on Frank Jackson’s two-
dimensional account in his From Metaphysics to Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998). I set out the background to Jackson’s conception of conceptual analysis and his 
rejection of a two senses view. I proceed to outline two purportedly objective (as 
opposed to epistemic) differences between metaphysical and logical necessity. I 
conclude that since one of these differences must hold and since each requires the 
adoption of a two senses view of necessity, essentialism is not consistent with the 
rejection of a two senses view. 
 
I. Terminological Preliminaries 
The essentialist holds that some but not all of a concrete object’s properties are had 
necessarily and that necessary properties include properties that are, unlike the property 
                                            
1 Thanks to John Divers, audiences at the Open University Regional Centre, Leeds and 
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of being such that logical and mathematical truths hold, non-trivially necessary. It is a 
necessary condition on a property’s being essential to an object that it is had of necessity. In 
the case of concrete objects, some such properties are discoverable by partly empirical 
means. The essentialist holds that there are a posteriori necessities with realist truth 
conditions. 
A two senses view of modality claims that metaphysical necessity is a different notion 
from logical necessity and that we must recognise this distinction if we are to make sense 
of attributions of necessity de re. 
The objective modalities are those that are unrestricted by ignorance and belief. 
Calling a modal notion ‘objective’ in this sense settles little about matters semantic and 
still less about matters metaphysical. A ‘one sense’, account of necessity has it that one 
notion of objective necessity can account for all objective necessities. Jackson (1998) 
adopts a one sense view. I will contend, using Jackson (1998) as a foil, that essentialism is 
not compatible with a one sense view of objective necessity. First, let us examine the 
background to Jackson’s view. 
 
II. Jackson on Conceptual Analysis and the A Priori 
Jackson (1998, pp. 46-52) distinguishes between the A- and C-extensions and intensions of 
terms (and the A- and C-truth conditions of sentences). The A-extension of a term is its 
referent in any world w, on the supposition, from the point of view of w, that w is the actual 
world. For inhabitants of Twin Earth, where Twin Earth is an occupant of a merely possible 
world, rather than a planet distant from Earth, the A-extension of ‘water’ is twater (i.e., the 
non-H2O stuff that is picked out by ‘water’ at Twin Earth). For earthlings, the A-extension 
of ‘water’ is water. A-extension is independent of considerations as to which world is in fact 
actual. C-extension lacks such independence. The C-extension of a term in a world w is its 
referent in w given whatever world is the actual world (w*). The C-extension of ‘water’ in 
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non-actual worlds (as in w*) is water: such worlds exhibit counterfactual stability in respect 
of the actual world. Whether or not H2O exists on Twin Earth, the Twin Earth C-extension 
of ‘water’ is water. In the actual world, any term’s A- and C-extensions are identical. The A-
intension of a term T ‘is the function assigning to each world the A-extension of T in that 
world’; its C-intension ‘is the function of assigning to each world the C-extension of T in 
that world’ (1998, p. 48). This account incorporates the Kripkean point that, when making 
counterfactual suppositions, we are constrained by the identities of objects in the actual 
world. If the extension of ‘water’ in w* is H2O then any supposition which entails that water 
is not H2O is not a counterfactual supposition about water. 
Jackson (1998, pp. 49-51) points out that there are frequent epistemic differences in 
respect of the A- and C-aspects of terms. Although Jackson does not and perhaps would 
not put it this way, one way of drawing the abstract/concrete distinction is useful in helping 
to explain such epistemic differences. Accordingly, the differences may be held to arise for 
terms the C-extensions of which are concrete, i.e., spatio-temporal, objects, but not for 
those the C-extensions of which are abstract objects.2 The A- and C-extensions of terms for 
concreta do not coincide in all possible worlds: this is illustrated by the foregoing Twin 
Earth example. Terms that are not A- and C- co-extensive are ‘two-dimensional’ (1998, p. 
50). Jackson provides ‘square’ as an example of a term the A- and C-extensions of which 
‘are the very same things’ in any world whatever (1998, p. 49).3 In our terms, then, this 
illustrates the general principle that the A- and C-extensions of a term for any given abstract 
object are the same in all possible worlds. Inspection of the actual world is of no epistemic 
                                            
2 For subtleties within this general approach to the concrete/abstract distinction and further 
references see Lowe (1998, Chapters 2 and 10). 
3 The distinction between two-dimensional terms and terms such as ‘square’ reflects 
Kripke’s distinction (1980, 49) between rigid and strongly rigid designators. 
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relevance to the A- or C-extension of a term for an abstract object: both are known a priori. 
Two-dimensional terms are different. Here, inspection of the actual world is necessary for 
knowledge of C-extension, but not for knowledge of A-extension. We know the C-
extension of ‘water’ in w* when we know its A-extension in w*. We know the C-extension of 
‘water’ in counterfactual worlds only when we know the nature or essence of its C-extension in 
w*. Accordingly, knowledge of the C-intension of a two-dimensional term requires knowledge 
of w*. Knowledge of a term’s A-intension never requires knowledge of w*. Conceptual 
analysis is a priori in that it is concerned with the A-extensions and A-intensions of terms. It 
is also concerned with the classification of terms as two-dimensional or not two-
dimensional: again, this is an a priori matter. 
 
III. Jackson’s One Sense Account of Necessity 
Jackson (1998, pp. 69-70) thinks that it is mistaken to suppose that essentialism requires a 
distinction between kinds of necessity: 
 
it is mistaken to hold that the necessity possessed by ‘Water = H2O’ is 
different from that possessed by ‘Water = water’, or indeed, ‘2+2 = 4’. . . . we 
should insist that water’s being H2O and water’s being water are necessary in 
the very same sense. The difference lies not in the kind of necessity 
possessed, but rather where the labels ‘a priori’ and ‘a posteriori’ suggest it 
lies: in our epistemic access to the necessity they share. . . . We should not 
multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity. The phenomena of the 
necessary a posteriori, and of essential properties, can be explained in terms 
of one unitary notion of a set of possible worlds. The phenomena do not call 
for a multiplication of senses of possibility and necessity, and in particular for 
a distinction among the possible worlds between the metaphysically possible 
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ones and the conceptually possible ones. 
 
 Jackson maintains that although there are epistemic differences between the necessities 
he mentions, these do not reflect different senses of necessity. It is correct that epistemic 
difference does not entail non-identity. For any objects a and b, if a has some epistemic 
feature lacked by b, it does not follow that a is not identical to b, since at least some of the 
epistemic features of an object are aptly classified as converse-intentional properties (i.e., 
relational properties conferred upon an object by mind). For our present purpose, notions, 
such as notions of necessity, need be considered no different from objects in this respect. If 
a notion of necessity N1 differs from a notion of necessity N2 in some epistemic respect it 
does not follow that N1 is not one and the same notion as N2. Standard logical necessity 
and essentialist necessity differ in an important epistemic respect. We may define the notion 
of a priority such that an item of knowledge has purely a priori status if its most fundamental 
form of justification is extra-empirical. Standard logical necessity, a notion accepted by 
essentialist metaphysicians and the logical positivists alike, is a purely a priori notion: logical 
necessities are most fundamentally justified via extra-empirical means. Essentialist necessity 
is not a purely a priori notion, since at least some essentialist necessities are most 
fundamentally justified in part by appeal to empirical facts. That epistemic difference, 
however, would appear to be neither necessary nor sufficient to illustrate a genuine failure 
of identity between standard logical necessity and essentialist necessity.4 We can agree with 
Jackson that to advocate a ‘two-senses’ view of necessity on none but epistemic grounds is 
                                            
4 This presumes the anti-Quinean theses that the standard notion of logical necessity is 
legitimate and non-empty and that there is a defensible and useful distinction between the a 
priori and the a posteriori. Work in defence of one or both of these theses includes Wright 
(1986), McFetridge (1990), Peacocke (1993; 1997) and Hale (1999). 
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to reason poorly. For non-identity of sense, we require some logical difference. 
 In order to highlight possible objective differences, I will consider cases which the 
proponent of a two senses view of necessity thinks to be metaphysical but not logical 
necessities. The two senses theorist believes there is a distinctively metaphysical sense of 
necessity that is not equivalent to logical necessity.  
 The holding of any one of the following differences is sufficient for a two senses 
view.  
 Logical form. Statements involving necessity1 and those involving necessity2 exhibit 
non-identical modal logical forms, the syntactic roles of their modal terms being 
irreducibly different. 
 Asymmetry of entailment. The necessity1 of a statement entails its necessity2, but not 
vice versa.5 
 Quantificational domain. Necessity1 involves quantification across an unrestricted 
domain; necessity2 across a restricted domain. 
 I will focus upon two accounts of metaphysical necessity either of which entails that at 
least one of these differences holds. On the first account, while sentential modal operators 
capture logical necessity, there are statements of metaphysical necessity de re that employ 
irreducibly non-sentential modal terms functioning as predicate or copula modifiers. On the 
second, such difference in logical form is not envisaged. Rather, when modal qualifiers are 
construed as sentential operators, differences in entailment relations remain between 
statements of metaphysical necessity and statements of logical necessity. 
 The dilemma I draw hinges on the disjunction that metaphysical necessity de re is either 
typically expressible via sentential modal operators or not typically so expressible. This is not 
                                            
5 Cf. McGinn (2000, p. 93) on difference in entailment relations as sufficient for 
difference in sense. 
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to suggest that an explication of modal idioms as sentential modal operators and an 
explication of at least some of them as predicate or copula modifiers exhaust the theoretical 
options. In view of the facility afforded by possible worlds semantics, it is common to 
construe modal terms as quantifiers over possible worlds, with sentential modal operators 
being viewed as derivative rather than primitive. Even on a quantifier treatment of modality, 
though, it is not denied that alethic modality is typically expressible via sentential modal 
operators.6 In the debate between operator treatments and quantifier treatments, the 
question is not whether alethic modality typically admits of sentential treatment, but 
whether this is the end or only the beginning of the story. 
 
IV. First Horn: The Logical Form of De Re Modality 
On the standard view of the distinction between de re and de dicto modality, it is a matter of 
syntax and is accounted for in terms of the scope of sentential modal operators.7 
 A modal construction is de re if it includes either  
(i) a name within the scope of a modal operator 
Fa 
Necessarily, 9 is an odd number. 
or  
(ii)  a modal operator within the scope of a quantifier 
(x)(Fx  ~Gx) 
                                            
6 For discussion of statements of possibility that pose problems for sentential accounts of 
de dicto modality, counting in favour of a quantifier treatment, see Melia (2003, Chapter 
4). 
7 See Sainsbury (1991, pp. 239-40), Forbes (1985, p. 48) and Hughes and Cresswell (1996, 
p. 250). 
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If a thing is a bachelor then, necessarily, it’s unmarried. 
A modal construction is de dicto if it meets neither 1 nor 2: 
(x) (Fx  ~Gx) 
Necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried.  
 On this account, de re and de dicto constructions exhibit different syntactic structures but 
this is not down to difference in the syntactic roles of the modal operators they employ: in 
all cases, these function as sentence modifiers. Thus the standard account does not commit 
to difference in logical form sufficient to justify a two senses view of necessity8 by the lights 
of logical form criterion of section III.9 
 There are non-standard views which take the distinction to be one of syntax but which 
hold not only that de re modality is irreducible to de dicto modality, but that de re modality is 
typically not sentential at all. On such accounts, the further condition of non-identity of 
syntactic role of the modal terms employed is considered met. David Wiggins (1976; 1980) 
has been a prominent exponent of a non-standard view on which such difference in 
syntactic role obtains between modal constructions de re and de dicto. 
 According to Wiggins (1980, p. 106), everyday modal locutions include modal idioms 
that do not function as sentential operators: ‘intuitive grammar suggests that “necessarily” 
and “possibly” can either govern a complete sentence . . .  or govern a simple or complex 
predicate.’ Wiggins (1976; 1980) argues that, contrary to the standard account of the de re/de 
dicto distinction, the difference between such forms and forms employing ‘it is 
necessary/possible that...’ is not to be explicated in terms of the scopes of the sentential 
                                            
8 Cf. Sainsbury (1991, 240). 
9 For details as to why it might be, on a standard account, that not all de re formulae are 
eliminable in favour of de dicto formulae, see Forbes (1985, pp. 54-7) and the references 
there. 
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modal operators (i.e., the standard boxes and diamonds). Rather, there are distinctively de re 
modal contexts in which modal idioms function non-sententially, modifying predicates and 
relations. Wiggins (1980, p. 106) claims that the latter usage is familiar under such verbal 
forms as ‘it is possible for x to V’, ‘it is necessary for x to be F’, ‘x can V’ and ‘it is possible 
for x to be F’. 
 On a non-standard view of de re modality, a statement of logical necessity is (at least 
typically) expressible via a sentence within the scope of a necessity operator whereas this is 
not the case for a statement of de re modality.10 The non-standard view offers us a syntactic 
difference that is far deeper than the standard account. It entails that the de re/de dicto 
distinction cannot properly be described as simply a matter of the scope of sentential 
operators.11 From a non-standard point-of-view, distinctively de re modal idioms do not 
admit of paraphrase using sentential modal operators. Not only is the de re irreducible to the 
de dicto, the syntactic operations of the modal terms employed are fundamentally different. 
 If non-standard accounts are right that some de re necessities do not admit of expression 
via sentential modal operators then a one sense account of necessity must be rejected. To 
see this, let us consider two routes to the claim that, typically, de re modal claims do not 
                                            
10 Wiggins (2001, p. 116) aims to rehabilitate sentential modal operators for the 
expression of (at least some) de re modal theses. It is not clear, however, how this is to 
square with the comment (2001, pp. 111-2) that the modality that governs predicates as 
opposed to sentences ‘lies outside all grades of modal involvement approved by Quine’. 
The reference is to Quine’s 1953 paper, ‘Three Grades of Modal Involvement’, 
reproduced as Quine (1966). Standard modalities de re and de dicto are contained within 
Quine’s second and third grades.  
11 Cf. McGinn (2000, Chapter 5). McGinn also disputes that de dicto modality is typically 
sentential, though I cannot pursue this here. 
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admit of sentential treatment. 
 First, attempting to paraphrase a de re modal claim sententially will often result in a 
sentence with a different truth-value. In the context of Wiggins’s account of the distinction 
between de re and de dicto modal constructions, the distinction between the following forms, 
explicated by Hacking (1975) is useful: 
 
(I) It is possible/necessary that p. 
(II) It is possible/necessary for x to V. 
 
In the case of possibility, take the following examples: 
 
(1) It is possible that Tom swims. 
(2) It is possible for Tom to swim. 
 
Suppose that, actually, Tom cannot swim: he has never learned to do so and even lacks the 
ability to learn. Thus, (2) is false. As students of the notion of logical possibility discover 
early on, this doesn’t threaten the truth of (1). A (I)-style possibility claim, then, is not 
necessarily co-extensive with its ‘corresponding’ (II)-style claim. 
 Turning to necessity, consider: 
 
(3) Cicero is necessarily human. 
(4) Necessarily, Cicero is human. 
(5) Necessarily, 7 is odd. 
(6) Necessarily, Cicero exists. 
(7) Necessarily, 7 exists. 
 
 11 
Wiggins (1976, 301) indicates grounds for holding that (3) and (4) are not  co-extensive and 
that assigning ‘only one structure to “Necessarily exists [a]”’ involves ‘counterintuitive 
results’. Supposing that ‘x is necessarily V’ is an unproblematic paraphrase of ‘It is necessary 
for x to be V’, what are the grounds for the claim that a (II)-style necessity claim is not 
necessarily co-extensive with its ‘corresponding’ (I)-style claim? Here, Wiggins appeals to the 
ontological platitudes that concrete particulars such as Cicero are taken to exist contingently, 
whereas numbers are taken to exist (if at all) necessarily. These platitudes underwrite our 
ordinary judgments that (7) is true and (6) false. If we are to treat all necessity-involving 
locutions as apt for (I)-style paraphrase, we cannot both treat ‘Necessarily’ as univocal and 
preserve our ordinary ascription of falsehood to (6). The appeal to Kripkean weak necessity 
will not do. The content of (5) is not exhausted by the claim that the number 7 is odd in all 
worlds in which it exists, and the content of (7) is not exhausted by the claim that the 
number 7 exists in all worlds in which it exists. Instead, both (5) and (7) involve 
commitment to the existence of the number 7 in absolutely all possible worlds. (The 
invocation of weak necessity can work, if at all, only as a means of accounting for the absence 
of univocity, e.g., between ‘Necessarily’ as it occurs in (4) as against in (7).  Even here, we 
shall soon see that there are problems.) 
 A couple of considerations weigh against the introduction of the distinction between 
rigid (‘ordinary’) and strongly rigid designators here. Firstly, it is not required if the natural 
language forms (I) and (II) already provide a solely syntactic method of explicating the de 
re/de dicto distinction. Secondly, the explication of rigid and strongly rigid designation itself 
appeals to the ontological –-and, to boot, modal–-  platitudes on which Wiggins’s case rests. 
The advocate of weak necessity has to decide upon the order, if any, of explanatory priority 
between the notions of weak necessity and ordinary rigid designation.  
 Appealing to weak necessity generates another counterintuitive (and indeed, counter-
theoretical) result. Accounting for (4) via weak necessity gives us: 
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(8) Necessarily, if Cicero exists then Cicero is human. 
 
Treating (6) the same way gives us: 
 
(9) Necessarily, if Cicero exists then Cicero exists. 
 
(6) then emerges as not only true, but tautologous. This is surely an unwelcome result. 
 In fact, the appeal to weak necessity is problematic in the cases of both (4) and (6). If de re 
necessity ascriptions are equivalent to weak sentential necessities, then, assuming that we 
adopt a classical account of conditionals on which false antecedent makes for true 
conditional, every purely intentional object has every property necessarily. If attributions of 
necessary existence are necessitated instances of the logical law p  p, then every object of 
thought is a necessary existent. Again, these are unwelcome results.12  
 Now for the second route to the claim that de re modality is typically non-sentential. A de 
re modal claim (S1) and its purported sentential translation (S2) will typically be such that (i) 
                                            
12 As the anonymous referee reminded me, Lowe (1998, 15) indicates a means, other than 
the appeal to weak necessity, of reconciling the necessity of ‘Water is H2O’ with the 
contingent existence of water. This is to construe it as meaning ‘For any x, x is water if 
and only if x is H2O’, which will be true in all possible worlds, though only vacuously so 
in worlds containing no water. Supposing that this works for identity statements, it does 
not account for other putative essentialist necessities such as (4). Given the difficulties 
with weak necessity, these remain in the way of reconciling a one-sense account of 
necessity with an essentialism any thicker than one that counts only identity statements as 
essentialist necessities a posteriori. 
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one of the pair does not entail the other, and (ii) differences of truth-value will be possible 
when (S1) and (S2) themselves appear within the scope of a sentential modal operator. 
Barring the case where the place of x in (II) is taken by p or by any necessary being, (I)-style 
possibility does not entail (II)-style possibility.  
 
(10) It is possible that Putnam levitates. 
(11) It is possible for Putnam to levitate. 
 
Condition (i) is met in that (10) does not entail (11). Condition (ii) is met in the following 
way. Plug (10) into ‘Necessarily…’ and (by the lights of the S5 principle that possibility 
entails necessary possibility) we get a truth. Do the same with (11) and, regardless of the 
truth-value of (11), we get a falsehood. As a corollary, plug (11) into ‘It is contingent 
that…’ and we get a possible truth. Do the same with (10) and we get a necessary 
falsehood. Such differences in entailment relations establish that we are dealing with 
logical forms featuring modal terms with irreducibly different syntactic roles: standard 
principles of sentential modality apply to (10) but not to (11). 
 In conclusion to this horn of the dilemma for the one sense theorist, when the syntax of 
metaphysical necessity de re is construed as (unlike logical necessity) typically not explicable 
by appeal to sentential modal operators, metaphysical modality is construed as distinct from 
logical modality. 
 
V. Second Horn: Logical Strength 
In constructing the second horn of my dilemma for the advocate of a one sense account of 
necessity, I appeal to some work, namely McFetridge (1990) and Hale (1996), in which the 
option of treating metaphysical necessity de re in a non-sentential fashion is not considered. I 
argue that even when metaphysical necessity de re is taken to be expressible by means of a 
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sentential modal operator a one sense account of necessity must be rejected. When both are 
treated sententially, asymmetry of entailment obtains between logical and metaphysical 
necessity. When possible worlds semantics is invoked to provide a quantifier treatment of 
modal operators, difference of quantificational domain obtains between logical and 
metaphysical necessity.  
 Concerning asymmetry of entailment, my claim is that the logical necessity that p 
entails the metaphysical necessity that p, but not vice versa.  
 In respect of the objective modalities, McFetridge defends some ‘traditional 
assumptions’, one of which is that ‘if it is logically necessary that p then it is necessary that p 
in any other use of the notion of necessity there may be...But...the converse need not be the 
case’ (1990, pp. 136-137). By the lights of this assumption, if it is objectively necessary that p 
but not logically necessary that p then there is more than one notion of objective necessity. 
 Kit Fine (1994, pp. 9-10) suggests that metaphysical necessities are truths in virtue of the 
natures of objects (whether abstract or concrete) and concepts. On such a theory, logical 
necessities are held to form a subspecies of metaphysical necessities. There is a distinction 
between the species of necessity since (i) the metaphysical necessity that p does not entail 
the logical necessity that p unless p is true in virtue of the natures of concepts and/or 
abstract entities, rather than concrete entities, and (ii) there are de re modal truths about 
concrete entities, some of which owe their truth to the natures of the entities involved, 
rather than to the natures of concepts and/or abstracta.13 Fine’s account does not pose a 
threat to my project. My contention is that regardless of whether logical necessity is a 
species of metaphysical necessity, metaphysical necessity is not a species of logical necessity.  
                                            
13 The contrast here is highlighted by such cases as: ‘Necessarily, Socrates is human’ and 
‘Necessarily, either Socrates is human or it is not the case that Socrates is human’. The 
former is purportedly true in virtue of the nature of Socrates; the latter is a logical truth. 
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If it is metaphysically necessary that p but it is not logically necessary that p then there is 
more than one notion of objective necessity. A difference in entailment relations between 
metaphysical necessities and logical necessities establishes the non-identity of the notions of 
necessity involved. Hale (1996, 93) provides a distinction relating to logical strength which 
can be used as a means of distinguishing between notions of objective necessity. A notion 
of necessity is absolute if when p is necessary in that sense there is no sense in which it is 
possible that p is false. If there is some sense of possibility in which p is false then the notion 
of necessity operant upon p is relative. If necessity1 is absolute and necessity2 relative, then 
necessity1 and necessity2 are distinct notions of necessity. Hale’s distinction does not debar 
a situation in which there is more than one absolute or more than one relative notion of 
necessity, but is nonetheless instructive in enabling us to distinguish between notions of 
necessity which differ in logical strength. 
 When de re necessity is treated as explicable sententially, I claim, it emerges that 
metaphysical necessity is logically weaker than logical necessity.  Hale (1996, 98) depicts this 
as a conclusion the essentialist will want to avoid, partly on the basis of Kripke’s claim 
that theoretical identities are necessary in the strongest sense.  Kripke does not give us 
the benefit of an account of what he means by strength and given his comments that 
necessity must be interpreted weakly for de re necessities that depend for their truth on 
the existence of contingent beings, I see no reason for the essentialist to balk at the 
suggestion that logical necessity is logically stronger than metaphysical necessity.14 A 
sentential treatment of de re necessity, together with some uncontroversial judgements 
about truth-values for modal claims, has the result that there are metaphysical necessities 
whose negations are logically possible. 
                                            
14 Cf. Moravcsik (1990, 101-2). 
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 Suppose that (4) above represents the de re necessary truth that Cicero is human. To 
save the contingency of Cicero’s existence, essentialists who adopt the standard account 
of the distinction between de re and de dicto modality invoke weak necessity, treating (8) as 
revelatory of the logical form of (4). Weak necessity is, as its name suggests, logically 
weaker than logical necessity. That is the point of having the notion of weak necessity. 
Let ‘’ be a weak necessity operator, ‘’ an unrestricted necessity operator, ‘E’ represent 
‘exists’ and let unbound variables be place-markers for proper names. The following 
principles obtain, where the ‘e’ versions are alternative formulations of the original ‘’- 
employing principles. 
 
 (WN1)  (Fx  Fx) 
  
 (WN1e)  (Fx  (Ex  Fx)) 
  
 (WN2)  ~(Fx  Fx) 
  
 (WN2e)  ~((Ex  Fx)  Fx) 
 
 By (WN1), it is unrestrictedly necessary that unrestricted necessity entails weak necessity. 
By  (WN2), it is not unrestrictedly necessary that weak necessity entails unrestricted 
necessity. When (4) is interpreted as an unrestricted necessity claim it is false. When (4) is 
interpreted as a weak necessity claim, it is at best necessary in a non-absolute sense.  In view 
of cases such as (4), (WN2) is legitimate. Since unrestricted necessity entails weak necessity 
and not vice versa, weak necessity is (unsurprisingly!) logically weaker than unrestricted 
necessity. Essentialists, then, cannot both have their cake of claiming that by ‘metaphysical 
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necessity’ they mean necessity in the (logically) strongest sense and eat that cake by claiming 
that metaphysical necessity is sometimes weak necessity. 
 In quantificational terms, the metaphysically possible worlds are not exhaustive of the 
possible worlds,15 since, for at least some metaphysical necessities their falsehood is logically 
possible. Logical necessities, unlike metaphysical necessities, hold in (unrestrictedly) all 
possible worlds. 
 In summary of this horn of the dilemma, given that a purely sentential characterisation 
of metaphysical necessity is correct, if it is necessary that p but it is not logically necessary 
that p then there is more than one notion of objective necessity. A difference in entailment 
relations between metaphysical necessities and logical necessities establishes the non-identity 
of the notions of necessity involved. If there is a difference in logical strength between 
metaphysical and logical necessities then a one sense account of necessity cannot be correct. 
Since logical but not metaphysical necessity is absolute in Hale’s sense such difference does 
obtain. So, even if de re modal truths admit of sententially modal treatment, the one-sense 
theorist appears to have, at least as things stand, no refuge from the charge that essentialism 
requires two senses of objective modality. 
 
VI. Summary 
Essentialism has it that there are de re modal truths about concrete entities. Metaphysical 
necessity de re is expressible either typically non-sententially or typically sententially. If it is 
represented non-sententially then a one sense account of necessity has to go. If it is 
represented sententially then a one sense account of necessity has to go. Therefore, the 
essentialist must reject a one sense account of necessity.  
 
                                            
15 Pace Lowe (1998, Chapter 1). 
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